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EVERYBODY’S GOT A PRICE: WHY 
ORANGE COUNTY’S PRACTICE OF 
TAKING DNA SAMPLES FROM 





Charlie Wolcott was cited in May 2009 for allegedly trespassing on 
railroad property in Orange County, California.1  Mr. Wolcott, a war 
veteran, had no prior arrests.2  At his hearing, he hoped to tell the judge that 
the “No Trespassing” sign was yards away and that he was simply walking 
through the property as a shortcut.3  Moments before his hearing, however, 
a deputy district attorney pulled him into a soundproof room and offered 
him a deal: the county would drop the charges if Wolcott agreed to submit a 
DNA sample.4
Orange County is the only county in California to maintain its own 
DNA database aside from the official California state DNA database.
 
5  This 
independence allows the county to work outside of the rules in place 
governing the federal and state DNA databases.6  Unlike the state and 
federal DNA databases, which were created by statute and contain various 
procedural safeguards, the county database was created and is managed by 
the district attorney’s office.7
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011.  Thank 
you to Professor Dorothy Roberts and to Warren Lipschitz, Dave Van Der Laan, Libby 
O’Neill, Matthew Berry, and Dimitrios Angelakos, all of who helped me immensely in 
writing this Comment. 
 




5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2008).  In 2009, California began mandating 
the collection of DNA samples from all individuals arrested for a felony. 
6 Abdollah, supra note 1, at A3. 
7 See id. 
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Mr. Wolcott, who admitted to being “freaked out” by the whole 
experience, is one of approximately 7,500 individuals who agreed to submit 
a DNA sample to the county in exchange for the county dropping non-
violent misdemeanor charges against them.8  The county district attorney’s 
office has quadrupled the size of its DNA database to 15,000 samples since 
January 2009, in large part due to individuals like Wolcott.9  The county 
explains the program to participants like Wolcott, but when faced with 
possible criminal prosecution, it is unclear how informed defendants are 
when they agree to submit to the county program.10  The district attorney 
justifies the program on the grounds that it will deter criminal activity and 
become a powerful tool for criminal investigations.11
Civil libertarians and law professors question the program’s fairness.
 
12  
Although the county claims that the program is voluntary for arrestees, one 
defense attorney suggests that she will advise all of her clients to submit a 
sample and avoid criminal prosecution.13  The $75 fee itself may be a 
particular burden to poor individuals who submit a DNA sample.14
Even law enforcement officials are critical of the county’s actions.  
The president of the Association of Orange County Sheriffs questions the 
deterrent effect of the program, arguing that there is no scientific evidence 
to suggest that the threat of DNA collection in exchange for release actually 
deters criminals.
 
15  Further, he contends that the program has a 
demoralizing effect on officers in the field who arrest suspected criminals 
only to see them released without charges.16
There are several potential legal challenges to the county’s DNA 
collection program.  Federal and state statutes authorize the collection of 
DNA from certain criminals, most commonly for those convicted of sex 
crimes and other violent offenses.
 
17  Several states also authorize the 
collection of DNA from arrestees in certain circumstances.18
 
8 Id. 
  While statutes 
authorizing DNA collection from convicts have been universally upheld, 
courts are split on the constitutional validity of statutes authorizing DNA 
9 Id. 
10 Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.?  A DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom, L.A. TIMES, 
Sep. 17, 2009, at A1.  
11 Id. 





17 The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §14135a (2006). 
18 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:609(A)(1) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-310.2:1 
(1996). 
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collection from arrestees.19  Challengers argue that these statutes authorize 
improper searches under the Fourth Amendment.20
The county’s program could also be challenged on Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection grounds.
 
21  One estimate suggests that 90% of 
urban black males will be arrested at some point in their lives.22
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide interesting bases 
from which to challenge the county’s DNA collection program.  A thorough 
discussion of each potential constitutional challenge to the county’s 
program is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Instead, this Comment will 
focus on whether a county government’s decision to drop criminal charges 
in exchange for a DNA sample to be permanently entered in a database and 
a $75 fee constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment 
Excessive Fines Clause.
  Since there 
are necessarily more arrests than convictions, racial disparities in the 
county’s DNA database may be even more severe than in databases 
currently in use. 
23
II. STATUTES AUTHORIZING COLLECTION OF ARRESTEES’ DNA AND THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
  This Comment will briefly summarize the 
current discussion on the constitutionality of statutes authorizing DNA 
collection from arrestees.  From there, it will discuss the text, history, and 
judicial interpretations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Ultimately, this Comment will show that Orange County’s 
program violates the Eighth Amendment rights of citizens to be free from 
the imposition of excessive fines. 
The county program maintains an individual’s DNA indefinitely 
regardless of the disposition of the arrestee’s case.24
 
19 Compare In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that Minnesota’s statute authorizing the taking of DNA from arrestees violates the 
Fourth Amendment), with Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007) 
(holding that DNA collection from an arrestee is justified).  See also infra Part II. 
  All fifty states 
20 See infra Part II. 
21 See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, 
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 452–457 
(2003) (describing racial skewing of DNA databases); see also Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra 
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data 
Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 146 (arguing that distinguishing between types of criminals 
would classify such arrestees in a matter that would warrant rational basis review because 
types of crimes are not suspect classifications). 
22 Kaye & Smith, supra note 21, at 455. 
23 The Eighth Amendment, which includes the Excessive Fines Clause, reads: “Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
24 Abdollah, supra note 10, at A1. 
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authorize criminal DNA databases, and every state—including California—
requires that DNA samples be taken from certain convicts, most commonly 
convicted sex offenders.25  Several states and the federal government 
authorize the collection of DNA at the time of arrest for certain crimes.26  
These statutes, however, authorize the collection of DNA upon arrest for 
felonies and federal crimes, not simple misdemeanors.  Further, these 
statutes require the destruction of the DNA sample when certain conditions 
are met, such as the charges being dropped or the individual being acquitted 
of the crime.27
Courts are split on the constitutionality of taking DNA from arrestees.  
The federal statute and two conflicting judicial interpretations thereof 
provide an excellent starting point for the discussion.
  The Orange County program has no such provision; 
individual samples are maintained in the DNA database indefinitely. 
28  Although both of 
these cases focus on the statute’s constitutionality under the Fourth 
Amendment, there are several relevant issues that suggest how future courts 
would rule on an Eighth Amendment challenge.29
 
25 Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in 
America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2001). 
 
26 See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006); DNA and 
Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (West 
2008). 
27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A) (2008) (requiring the director of the FBI to 
expunge an arrestee’s record if the conviction is overturned or if the charges are dropped, the 
individual is acquitted, or the individual is never charged); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299 
(requiring the destruction of an individual’s DNA sample if the person has no past, present, 
or pending charge which qualifies for inclusion in the database; the person is never charged 
with the crime for which he or she was arrested; the individual’s conviction has been 
reversed or his or her case has been dismissed; or the individual has been found not guilty of 
the charged offense). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006)  (“The Attorney General may, as prescribed by the 
Attorney General in regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, 
facing charges, or convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained under the 
authority of the United States.”). 
29 A thorough discussion of Fourth Amendment cases is well beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  The Fourth Amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Searches must be based on probable cause.  If there is no warrant or 
showing of probable cause, the search must fall into one of two exceptions: the “special 
needs” exception or the “totality of the circumstances exception.”  For a thorough 
explanation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the application of the “special needs” 
and “totality of the circumstances” exceptions to the probable cause requirement, see 
generally John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection 
Statutes and Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619 (2009); Paul M. 
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In United States v. Pool, a criminal defendant pled not guilty to a 
crime involving possession of child pornography.30  The defendant had no 
prior criminal record.  At his arraignment, he agreed to a series of pretrial 
conditions but refused to submit to court-ordered DNA testing as required 
by the Bail Reform Act31 and the DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005.32  He 
challenged both statutes on the grounds that they authorized an 
unconstitutional search.33
The court rejected Pool’s argument, but suggested that it would not 
authorize DNA collection from all arrestees.  First, the court rejected Pool’s 
argument that the presumption of innocence for criminal defendants 
warrants a “special needs” analysis for the reasonableness of a search.
 
34  
Because the defendant had already been indicted and arraigned, he was 
subject to greater restrictions than an “ordinary citizen.”35  The court 
reasoned that “[t]he judicial or grand jury finding of probable cause within a 
criminal proceeding is a watershed event . . . .  After such a judicial finding, 
a defendant’s liberty may be greatly restricted—even denied.”36
Although the court was willing to uphold the legality of collecting 
DNA from Pool and other pretrial detainees, it was not willing to extend its 
holding to misdemeanor arrestees: 
 
 
Monteleoni, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
247 (2007). 
30 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 19133 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010). 
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b).  The statute provides: 
 Release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond.  The judicial officer shall 
order the pretrial release of the person on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an 
unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the 
person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to the 
condition that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if the 
collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)), unless the judicial officer determines that such 
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the 
safety of any other person in the community. 
32 Pub. L. No. 96-162, § 1001–05 (codified 42 U.S.C. § 14135a). 
33 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 905–06. 
34 Id.  In most cases, for a search under the Fourth Amendment to be “reasonable,” it 
must be based on individualized probable cause.  Courts recognize exceptions to this 
doctrine, however, when a “special need” exists that requires government officials to go 
outside the restrictions placed on law enforcement.  For a thorough special needs analysis of 
DNA collection statutes, see Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special 
Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment?  What Should (And Will) The Supreme Court 
Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102, 107–08 (2005). 
35 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 909. 
36 Id. 
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The undersigned emphasizes what this holding does not encompass.  It does not 
authorize DNA sampling after citation or arrest for infractions or misdemeanors, as in 
these cases there will be no judicial finding of probable cause soon after the arrest or 
citation, or no grand jury finding before or after the arrest.  See, Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a).  
It does not authorize police officials to perform DNA sampling prior to a judicial 
finding of probable cause which must be made within 48 hours after arrest and 
detention.  Again, it is the finding of probable cause on criminal charges which allows 
the court to set release conditions similar to those of probation and parole, which is 
the underpinning of the court’s holding in this case.37
The court seems to suggest that without a judicial or grand jury finding 
of probable cause, the taking and storage of DNA from an arrestee 
constitutes a punishment in the absence of a conviction. 
 
Just months after Pool, a federal district judge in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania disagreed with the Pool court and held that the DNA 
collection statute was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.38  In 
United States v. Mitchell, the defendant was indicted for allegedly 
attempting to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to 
distribute.39  He objected to the trial court’s request for a pretrial DNA 
sample and a magistrate judge stayed the DNA collection until the district 
court could hear the case.40
The court rejected Pool’s holding that the grand jury indictment carries 
special weight in the determination of a defendant’s guilt.
 
41  According to 
the Mitchell court, the presumption of innocence stays with a criminal 
defendant until a verdict is entered, and it is unjust to treat him as though he 
is guilty at the indictment stage.42  The court also placed particular weight 
on the intensely private nature of DNA data.43  An individual has a strong 
interest in keeping his “complex and comprehensive” genetic information 
private.44  Once information becomes pervasively available to the public, 
however, the individual may lose his privacy interest in the information.45  
This concern warrants Fourth Amendment protection of an individual’s 
DNA when he is presumed to be innocent of any crime.46
 
37 Id. at 913 (emphasis in original). 
 
38 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
39 Id. at 599. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 603–04. 
42 Id. at 606. 
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The court also found that DNA databases serve an inherently 
investigatory purpose that photograph and fingerprint databases do not.47  
Because a law enforcement agency can run a search against all the samples 
in the DNA database any time it wants, the individual who submits his 
DNA is subject to countless searches without a warrant or showing of 
probable cause.48  Further, because DNA is immutable, there is no 
possibility of an individual altering his DNA to hide his identity.49  If a law 
enforcement agency has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is 
involved in criminal activity, it can seek out a warrant for his or her DNA 
and can conduct a search legally.50
Mitchell supports the proposition that maintaining an arrestee’s DNA 
indefinitely stretches the prosecutorial power beyond what is 
constitutionally acceptable.  Although Pool allows the collection of a 
defendant’s DNA prior to conviction, it is noteworthy that the Pool court 
was persuaded in part by the procedural safeguards associated with an 
indictment.  Orange County’s program does not wait until a defendant is 
indicted to collect and preserve his DNA sample. 
 
To reiterate, both of these cases concentrated their analyses on the 
Fourth Amendment.  These cases are relevant, however, to understand the 
punitive nature of DNA collection statutes, especially when they require the 
collection of DNA from individuals who are still presumed innocent.  To fit 
the county’s DNA collection program into the Eighth Amendment 
excessive fine framework, it is necessary to discuss the text and history of 
the Excessive Fines Clause. 
III. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE: TEXT AND HISTORY 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution states: “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”51  An originalist interpretation of the term “fine” is 
“a pecuniary punishment; penalty; forfeit; money paid for any exemption or 
liberty.”52
The Supreme Court did not hear a case interpreting the Excessive 




47 Id. at 609. 




51 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
52 JOHN WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791). 
53 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) 
(holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive damages in 
civil actions between private parties). 
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Clause, it summarized the historical context in which the Clause was 
adopted to discern its meaning.  At least eight of the original thirteen states 
already had an excessive fines clause in their declaration of rights or state 
constitution.54  The Clause was adopted almost verbatim from the English 
Bill of Rights.55  Prior to the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, judges 
had used their power to fine convicts to extract revenge on the King’s 
enemies.56  Some of the King’s opponents were unable to get out of jail 
because of disproportionate fines levied from the bench.57  The Excessive 
Fines Clause is in place to “limit[] the ability of the sovereign to use its 
prosecutorial power, including the power to collect fines, for improper 
ends.”58
One common fine is a required forfeiture of money as part of a 
punishment for a criminal act.
 
59  In Powell v. Texas, an alcoholic pled guilty 
to violating a Texas statute that forbade individuals from being intoxicated 
in public.60  The trial court ordered him to pay $20.61
A penalty imposed by the government on an individual does not 
necessarily have to attach itself to a criminal conviction to be a fine.  
Several statutes allow for the seizure of an individual’s property when that 
property is used in the course of a criminal act;
  Fines such as the one 
in Powell are criminal forfeitures; the fine is imposed after the individual 
has been convicted of a crime. 
62 this government action is a 
civil forfeiture, where conviction is not a prerequisite.63
 
54 Id. at 264. 
  The traditional rule 
55 “Excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and 
unusual Punishments inflicted.” 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441 
(1689). 
56 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267. 
57 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
58 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267. 
59 See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968). 
60 Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE, art. 477 (1952), which stated: “Whoever shall get 
drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house 
except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.”). 
61 Id.  Powell appealed on the grounds that his chronic alcoholism made it impossible to 
abide by the statute.  The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that fining an 
individual with alcoholism for public drunkenness does not necessarily constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.  Id. at 535. 
62 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2006) (subjecting real and personal property to forfeiture 
when used in the commission of certain federal offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (2006) 
(allowing for the forfeiture of any property used in violation of the Prohibition on Illegal 
Gambling Businesses statute); 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006) (allowing for the seizure of real and 
personal property pertaining to or obtained with profits from the sale or production of child 
pornography when an individual has been convicted of a relevant offense); 31 U.S.C. § 5316 
(2006) (allowing for forfeiture of property in money laundering offenses).  
63 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827). 
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was that civil forfeiture, as opposed to criminal forfeiture, was against the 
property itself and not the individual.64  As a result, the guilt or innocence 
of the owner was irrelevant.  In The Palmyra, the Supreme Court held that a 
criminal conviction was not necessary to allow the government to seize the 
property of a ship owner and his crew suspected of piracy.65  The Palmyra 
stands for the proposition that a fine is a required forfeiture of property by 
an individual to the government.  It does not have to be attached to a 
conviction; the property itself is considered to be guilty.66
The Supreme Court altered the course of excessive fines jurisprudence 
in 1993.  In Austin v. United States, the Court resolved the question of 
whether a civil forfeiture can be excessive under the Excessive Fines 
Clause.
 
67  The defendant was indicted on four counts of violating South 
Dakota’s drug laws, and the United States government filed an civil action 
seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s mobile home and auto body shop 
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7).68  Austin filed suit against the 
Government, alleging that the required forfeiture of his property represented 
an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.69
The Court first rejected the Government’s argument that the Eighth 
Amendment protection against excessive fines is limited only to criminal 
actions.  The Fifth and Sixth Amendments explicitly mention criminal 
prosecutions to limit their scope to criminal proceedings; the Eighth 




64 Id. at 14.  This explains the interesting party names in this field of law.  See, e.g., 
United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995). 
  Further, the Framers, in discussing 
65 Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15. 
66 This is a recent development brought about by the Court’s decision in Austin v. United 
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).  Prior to Austin, courts viewed civil forfeiture as “a means of 
remedying the government’s injury and loss.”  United States v. A Parcel of Land with A 
Bldg. Located Thereon at 40 Moon Hill Road, Northbridge, Mass., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
67 Austin, 509 U.S. at 602. 
68 Id. at 604–05.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2006) provides, in relevant part:  
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist 
in them: . . . (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are 
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) . . . .  (7) All real 
property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of 
any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be 
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this 
subchapter punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. 
69 Austin, 509 U.S. at 606. 
70 Id. at 607–08.  The Fifth Amendment reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
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the Bill of Rights, made a conscious choice to limit the Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination clause to criminal proceedings, and then moved the 
debate to discussion of the Eighth Amendment, to which there was no 
motion to limit its scope.71  The Eighth Amendment limits the 
government’s ability to punish individuals in both the criminal and civil 
contexts.72  The pertinent question in an excessive fines analysis is not 
whether the forfeiture is civil or criminal, but whether it is a punishment.73
The Court next turned its attention to whether a civil forfeiture is a 
punishment.  The Court determined from the language of the statute and 
from the statute’s legislative history that civil forfeitures can indeed 
constitute punishments and are thus subject to Eighth Amendment 
Excessive Fines Clause analysis.
 
74  The Court noted that the statute 
included an “innocent owner” defense for those whose property was 
involved in criminal conduct without knowledge.75  The Court inferred 
from this exception that Congress intended to punish those involved in the 
criminal conduct covered by the statute (in this case, drug trafficking).76  
Further, Congress explained in the statute’s legislative history “that the 
traditional criminal sanction of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to 
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs.”77
For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to distinguish 
between criminal and civil forfeitures.
 
78  To constitute a fine under the 
Eighth Amendment, the forfeiture must be a punishment.79
 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
  Criminal 
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Sixth Amendment reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
71 Austin, 509 U.S. at 608-09 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 294 (1989)). 
72 Austin, 509 U.S. at 609–10. 
73 Id. at 610. 
74 Id. at 621–22. 
75 Id. at 619. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 620 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983)). 
78 The Orange County district attorney’s DNA collection program exists in a gray area 
between in rem and in personam forfeiture.  See infra Part III. 
79 Austin, 509 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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forfeiture punishes the owner’s criminal conduct by taking his property; it is 
not necessary to establish a nexus between the property and the criminal 
conduct.80  As a prerequisite for criminal forfeiture, there must be a 
criminal conviction.  Civil forfeiture, however, is based on the legal fiction 
that the property itself bears some guilt in the matter.81
The Court’s jurisprudence on the Excessive Fines Clause leaves the 
matter unsettled but does provide some guidelines for future excessive fines 
analysis.  Monetary penalties or property forfeitures as part of a criminal 
sentence are the most obvious types of fines.  A criminal conviction is a 
necessary condition for the government to impose these fines. 
 
The question of whether a government action is a fine is more difficult 
in the civil context.  The threshold question, as established in Browning-
Ferris and Austin, is whether the government action is punitive.  Once a 
government action taken against an individual (or his property) is 
determined to be a fine, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether 
it is excessive. 
Since Austin, three approaches have developed to determine 
excessiveness.  The first is a proportionality approach taken by the majority 
in Austin and later adopted by the Eighth Circuit.82
In United States v. Bieri, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the lack of 
guidance from the Supreme Court on a multi-factor test for excessiveness 
and then created its own test.
  Courts applying this 
approach compare the fine levied with the offense to determine whether the 
fine was proportional to the offense. 
83  First, the defendant has the burden of 
showing that the fine is grossly disproportionate to the offense.84  Second, 
“The [E]ighth [A]mendment demands that a constitutionally cognizable 
disproportionality reach such a level of excessiveness that in justice the 
punishment is more criminal than the crime.”85  Relevant factors in 
determining the proportionality of the fine are the extent and duration of the 
criminal conduct, the gravity of the offense weighed against the sanction, 
and the value of the property forfeited.86 
 
80 Id. 
The general principle of the proportionality approach is that the gravity 
of the fine should not grossly exceed the culpability of the defendant.  The 
81 Id. 
82 See United States v. Premises Known as 6040 Wentworth Ave. South, Minneapolis, 
Hennepin Cnty., Minn., 123 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alexander, 108 F.3d 
853 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1995). 
83 Bieri, 68 F.3d at 236. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
86 Id. 
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burden is on the defendant, however, to show that the fine is grossly 
disproportionate to the offense.  This creates a serious hurdle for individuals 
fined by the government to clear before proving that the fine levied against 
them was excessive. 
The second approach to determining excessiveness is an 
instrumentality approach, first described by Justice Scalia in his concurring 
opinion to Austin.87  The instrumentality approach maintains elements of 
the traditional rule that the fictional guilt of the property itself warranted its 
forfeiture.  Justice Scalia’s argument is that the only relevant question in an 
excessiveness analysis is whether the property forfeited played an 
instrumental role in the illegal activity.  “Scales used to measure out 
unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the 
purest gold or the basest metal. . . .  The question is not how much the 
confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a 
close enough relationship to the offense.”88 
The Fourth Circuit adopted a three-part instrumentality test in United 
States v. Chandler when it determined that the forfeiture of a thirty-three 
acre farm worth $569,000 was not excessive.89  The court upheld the 
forfeiture because defendants had “distributed, packaged, sold, purchased 
and used controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine and 
quaaludes,” on the property and the property played an integral role in the 
illegal activity.90  The court considered “(1) the nexus between the offense 
and the property and the extent of the property’s role in the offense, (2) the 
role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating 
offending property that can readily be separated from the remainder.”91 
In applying the instrumentality approach, the court looked to 
Congress’s intent in creating the statute that the defendant allegedly 
violated.  Because Congress’s intent was to punish drug traffickers, the key 
question—according to courts using the instrumentality approach—should 
be how tainted is the property by the illegal activity and not how valuable is 
the property relative to the gravity of the offense.92
 
87 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
88 Id. at 627–28. 
89 United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled by United States v. 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334–35 (1998) (overruling three-part instrumentality test). 
90 Id. at 361. 
91 Id. at 365. 
92 Id. at 364.   
Forfeiture of a $14 million yacht, specially outfitted with high-powered motors, radar, and secret 
compartments for the sole purpose of transporting drugs from a foreign country into the United 
States, would probably offend no one’s sense of excessiveness, even though the property has 
such a high value.  On the other hand, forfeiture of a row house, which is owned by an elderly 
woman and which shelters her children and grandchildren, upon discovery of a trace amount of 
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For several years, courts were split on whether to apply the 
proportionality approach or the instrumentality approach.93  The Supreme 
Court resolved the confusion over the proper test for excessiveness in 
United States v. Bajakajian.94  In that case, police dogs stopped Bajakajian 
at the airport as he was preparing to board an international flight with 
$357,144 in cash.95  He was found to be in violation of a statute forbidding 
the removal of more than $10,000 in cash without declaration and was 
ordered to forfeit all $357,144 to the United States government as part of 
his penalty.96
 
cocaine in a grandson’s room, might arguably be found to be excessive, even though the house 
has a relatively low value of $30,000.  In both cases, the intuitive excessiveness analysis centers 
on the relationship between the property and the offense—the more incidental or fortuitous the 
involvement of the property in the offense, the stronger the argument that its forfeiture is 
excessive.  When measuring the strength or extent of the property’s relationship to the offense, 
i.e., its instrumentality in the offense, we would look at whether the property’s role was 
supportive, important, or even necessary to the success of the illegal activity.  We would also 
inquire into whether the use of the property was deliberate or planned, as distinguished from 
incidental or fortuitous.  We would note whether the property was used once or repeatedly, 
whether a small portion was used, and whether the property was put to other uses and the extent 
of those uses.   
 
Id. 
93 Some courts have developed hybrid approaches incorporating the proportionality and 
instrumentality tests.  One hybrid approach that has gained somewhat widespread acceptance 
is that taken by the Second Circuit in United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).  
The court held that a test for excessiveness depends on: 
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property’s role in the 
offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending 
property that can readily be separated from the remainder.  In measuring the strength and extent 
of the nexus between the property and the offense, a court may take into account the following 
factors: (1) whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate and planned or merely 
incidental and fortuitous; (2) whether the property was important to the success of the illegal 
activity; (3) the time during which the property was illegally used and the spatial extent of its 
use; (4) whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been repeated; and (5) whether the 
purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense.  No one 
factor is dispositive but, to sustain a forfeiture against an Eighth Amendment challenge, the court 
must be able to conclude, under the totality of circumstances, that the property was a substantial 
and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the offense, or would have been, had the 
offensive conduct been carried out as intended. 
Id. at 846.  
 The hybrid approach allows the court to consider many factors in determining whether 
the fine is excessive.  A multi-pronged approach has the benefit of addressing any fairness 
concerns that may arise from strict adherence to the proportionality approach or the 
instrumentality approach.  The hybrid approach, however, may be too detailed to be 
consistently applied. 
94 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
95 Id. at 324. 
96 Id. at 324–25.  The statute states, in relevant part: “The court, in imposing sentence on 
a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall 
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In its analysis, the Court cited back to Austin for the principle that 
whether a government proceeding is in rem or in personam, the key 
question in determining whether the action is a fine is whether it is a 
punishment.97  The Court “ha[d] little trouble concluding that the forfeiture 
of currency ordered by § 982(a)(1) constitutes punishment.”98
The Ninth Circuit had applied a hybrid test in its analysis of 
Bajakajian’s claim.
  The next 
question, then, was whether the fine was excessive. 
99  The Supreme Court, however, rejected this test and 
stated definitively that a proportionality approach was the proper way to 
analyze the excessiveness of a fine under the Excessive Fines Clause.  A 
fine must be “grossly disproportional” to the offense in order to constitute 
an excessive fine.100  The Court looked to the text and history of the Eighth 
Amendment and remarked that neither source helped to determine exactly 
how grossly disproportional a fine must be to become unconstitutional.101  
Instead, the Court identified two relevant sources.  First, the Court held that 
judgments on the appropriate level of punishment for a particular offense 
should be made by the legislature.102  When the legislature determines the 
types and limits of punishment for a particular crime, it is making a policy 
judgment within its Constitutional authority and should be given great 
deference by courts.103  Second, the judiciary should be guided by the 
Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Solem v. Helm,104 which established a 
test for when punishment is cruel and unusual.105
In Solem, the Court held that although it would rarely uphold 
challenges to punishments on Eighth Amendment grounds outside of the 
capital punishment context, it would still consider several factors in 




order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in 
such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”  18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006). 
  This 
particular case involved a challenge to a criminal sentence on the grounds 
97 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6. 
98 Id. at 328. 
99 Id. at 326 (stating that the Ninth Circuit held that “to satisfy the Excessive Fines 
Clause, a forfeiture must fulfill two conditions: The property forfeited must be an 
‘instrumentality’ of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional 
to the culpability of the owner.”).  For a more detailed explanation of the hybrid approach, 
see supra note 93. 
100 Id. at 334. 
101 Id. at 335. 
102 Id. at 336. 
103 Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) and Gore v. United States, 357 
U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). 
104 Solem, 463 U.S. at 277. 
105 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336. 
106 Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. 
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that the sentence was cruel and unusual.107  The first factor is a comparison 
between the crime and the penalty—essentially a proportionality test.108  
The second factor is a comparison between sentences of other criminals in 
the jurisdiction for various crimes to get a sense of the range of acceptable 
sentences in the jurisdiction.109  Third is a comparison between the 
defendant’s sentence and the sentences given for similar crimes in different 
jurisdictions.110
Relying on this analysis from Solem, the Court addressed the fine 
levied on Bajakajian.  His principal offense was that he did not report the 
money he tried to carry onto the plane; carrying the currency would have 
been legal had he reported it.
 
111  The statute was enacted to prevent drug 
traffickers, and requiring Bajakajian to forfeit the entire $357,144 would 
not further the goals of the statute.112  Second, the sentencing guidelines 
allowed a maximum six-month sentence and fine of $5,000 for conviction 
under the particular section of the statute that Bajakajian allegedly 
violated.113  Similar behavior to Bajakajian’s would presumably net a much 
lighter sentence in other courts and jurisdictions.114  On the basis of these 
two factors, the Court held that requiring forfeiture of the entire $357,144 
was an excessive fine and, for the first time in its history, invalidated a 
government-imposed fine as unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines 
Clause.115
Moving forward, the Supreme Court—and presumably lower courts—
will likely evaluate Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause challenges 
using the framework it established in Bajakajian.
 
116  The two sources of 
information relevant to the determination of whether a fine is excessive are 
the legislature and the courts.117  If the fine imposed by the government is 
“grossly disproportional” to the punishment that the legislature intended or 








111 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–38 (1998). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 338. 
114 Id. at 339. 
115 Id. at 344. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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Much of the discussion of excessive fines in this Comment has focused 
on forfeitures of property.  For the forfeiture of a DNA sample to be 
considered a fine, DNA must first be considered personal property.  The 
next part of this comment explores the current debate on whether DNA is 
personal property. 
IV. DNA AS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The Framers almost certainly did not contemplate the complexities of 
genetics when they drafted the Eighth Amendment.  Recent actions by state 
legislatures and the California Supreme Court provide some insight into the 
question of whether courts will recognize DNA as personal property in the 
context of an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause challenge to the 
county’s DNA collection program.  In light of recent statutory trends 
towards recognizing a personal property interest in one’s DNA for 
employment and insurance purposes, it seems that DNA should be 
recognized as personal property in the criminal context as well. 
In response to the possibility of genetic discrimination by insurance 
companies, some states have acted to protect an individual’s right to her 
own genetic information.  Four states—Alaska, Colorado, Florida, and 
Georgia—define the genetic information contained in DNA molecules as 
personal property by statute.119  Of the four states, Alaska recognizes the 
most comprehensive individual right to one’s own DNA.  The Alaska 
statute contains an explicit provision stating, “A DNA sample and the 
results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive 
property of the person sampled or analyzed.”120  The three other statutes 
refer to an individual’s property right in his or her genetic information.121
One possible interpretation is that the Alaska statute protects both the 
genetic information stored on the DNA molecule and the physical sample 
itself.  The Colorado, Florida, and Georgia statutes may only protect the 
actual genetic information, which may be indicative of risk factors for 
certain health conditions, and not the physical sample.  It bears mentioning, 
however, that it would be difficult to parse “genetic information” from a 
 
 
119 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2008) (“[A] DNA sample and the results of a DNA 
analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled or 
analyzed.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2010) (“Genetic information 
is the unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a 
public or private entity, are the exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and 
may not be disclosed without the consent of the person tested.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-
1(1) (West 2003) (“Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested.”). 
120 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2). 
121 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1).  
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“DNA sample” because one cannot extract the genetic information from an 
individual without taking a physical DNA sample. 
Another relevant consideration is the context in which the statutes 
were written.  The Alaska and Florida statutes serve as general bans on the 
misappropriation of another person’s genetic information.122  The Colorado 
and Georgia statutes address concerns that insurance companies would use 
genetic information to discriminate against potential customers on the basis 
of some genetic indicators of possible pre-existing or future conditions.123
Congress recognized an individual’s interest in freedom from genetic 
discrimination by employers when it enacted the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008.
  
Although both statutes serve the purpose of protecting consumers from 
prying insurance companies, it seems reasonable to infer a property interest 
in one’s DNA that would extend to other contexts. 
124  GINA prohibits employers 
from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information from 
potential or current employees or their family members.125  Employers 
cannot use genetic information to make any decisions relevant to 
employment, including discharge and compensation.126
The bill was passed 95–0 in the Senate and 414–1 in the House.
 
127
The California Supreme Court has come closest to addressing whether 
genetic information is personal property.  The most prominent case on the 
  
The overwhelming margin by which GINA was passed suggests that 
Congress recognizes a personal interest in genetic information.  Underlying 
the aforementioned state statutes and GINA seems to be a concern that an 
innocent person’s genetic information could be used against them.  Courts, 
however, have not yet definitely answered the question of whether DNA is 
personal property. 
 
122 Neither the Alaska statute nor the Florida statute contains language suggesting that 
the statutes were enacted to protect consumers against insurance companies, though the 
Florida statute requires entities to notify individuals if genetic information was used to deny 
them insurance.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(3). 
123 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(d) (“The intent of this section is to prevent 
information derived from genetic testing from being used to deny access to group disability 
insurance or long-term care insurance coverage.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(4) (“The intent 
of this chapter is to prevent accident and sickness insurance companies, health maintenance 
organizations, managed care organizations, and other payors from using information derived 
from genetic testing to deny access to accident and sickness insurance.”). 




127 Congressman Ron Paul was the lone dissenter.  145 Cong. Rec. H2980 (2008).  
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subject is Moore v. The Regents of the University of California.128  
Although Moore does not directly address whether genetic information is 
personal property, the court’s discussion provides insight into how a 
modern court would analyze an argument that a litigant holds an actionable 
interest in his own DNA.  In that case, the plaintiff (Moore) underwent 
treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA Medical Center.129  In the course 
of treatment, defendant physicians conducted a splenectomy and regularly 
removed blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances.130  
Moore, under the impression that the splenectomy was necessary to save his 
life, signed a consent form for the procedure.131  Unbeknownst to Moore, 
his doctors were using the material they extracted from him to develop a 
highly lucrative commercial cell line from which they planned to make a 
considerable profit.132  Moore filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duty 
and conversion of his personal property.133  The California Supreme Court’s 
analysis of his conversion claim provides a relevant insight into one answer 
to the DNA-as-personal-property question.134
The foundation of Moore’s claim of conversion was that he had a 
proprietary interest in any product that might be created from his cells.
 
135  
This was a departure from traditional conversion theory because the 
plaintiff must have actual ownership or possession of the good that the 
defendant converts.136  Further, physical possession of one’s cells—or any 
other human tissue—after their removal in a scientific procedure was 
prohibited by statute in California.137
Moore failed to convince the court to extend conversion liability to his 
particular case for three reasons.  First, the court considered the policy 




128 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990). 
 acknowledging tension between 
129 Id. at 125. 
130 Id. at 125–26. 
131 Id. at 126. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 128.  
134 The court defined conversion as “the plaintiff was possessed of certain goods, that he 
casually lost them, that the defendant found them, and that the defendant did not return them, 
but instead ‘converted them to his own use.’  From that phrase in the pleading came the 
name of the tort.”  Id. at 135 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 89 (W. 
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). 
135 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 135. 
136 Id. at 136. 
137 Id. at 137 (“Human tissues . . . following conclusion of scientific use shall be 
disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state 
department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.”) (quoting CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 2007)). 
138 Id. at 142–43. 
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competing policy goals.139  The judicial system should provide recourse to 
patients whose doctors act with motives other than the patient’s health that 
may affect their professional decision-making.140  The judicial system 
should also, however, allow doctors to engage in the “socially useful” 
practice of medical research without fear of liability when there is no reason 
to believe that a patient would object to their work.141  Ultimately, the court 
determined that laws governing disclosure of information to patients cover 
the dispute better than subjecting doctors to tort liability for conversion.142
The court’s second rationale for rejecting Moore’s claim was that 
major changes in policy are best suited for the legislature.
 
143  Third, the 
court argued that a cause of action for conversion is not necessary to protect 
patients because laws governing disclosure of information serve that 
purpose more effectively than tort liability.144
One reading of Moore suggests that the California Supreme Court 
would be unsympathetic to a claim that an individual’s DNA is his or her 
personal property.  Several details in the Moore decision indicate, however, 
that the court’s decision may not be the final word on whether DNA is 
personal property. 
 
The court explicitly stated that Moore could not expect to maintain an 
ownership interest in his cells once they had been removed.145
Finally, the court explicitly reserved the question of whether Moore’s 
DNA is his personal property.
  For Moore 
to lose an ownership interest in his cells, he had to have some original 
ownership interest in the biological material.  For an individual to 
relinquish his property interest by signing a consent form, he must have a 
property interest to relinquish.  The court also noted that the commercial 
cell line from which the defendants profited was a fundamentally different 
product than the cells excised from Moore.  This distinction does not exist 
between DNA in the body and DNA as stored as a sample in a database. 
146
A variety of arguments have been made both for and against 
recognition of DNA as personal property.  It is beyond the scope of this 
  After Moore, it is unclear whether a 
California court would recognize DNA as personal property. 
 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 143. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 147. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 136–37. 
146 Id. at 135. 
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Comment to fully explore current scholarship on this topic.147
V. IS THE FORFEITURE OF AN ARRESTEE’S DNA AN EXCESSIVE FINE 
UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT? 
  The debate 
over whether DNA is personal property will likely continue until Congress 
or the Supreme Court decisively resolves the question.  For the purposes of 
the analysis, however, this Comment sides with the Alaska, Colorado, 
Georgia, and Florida legislatures and the Congress that enacted GINA in 
determining that DNA is the personal property of the individual to whom 
the genetic information belongs. 
A government program that punishes individuals without granting 
them a criminal trial is inherently suspicious.  The county’s DNA collection 
program exists in a gray area between civil and criminal action.  One of the 
essential components of the county’s program is that it is a substitute for a 
criminal conviction.  As a result, it does not fit neatly into criminal 
forfeiture analysis.  The government’s action is not distinctly civil either; it 
exists within the criminal justice system.  Although an argument could be 
made that one’s genetic material is always instrumental to the commission 
of any offense, it is almost impossible that such an argument fits within the 
“guilty property” fiction used to justify civil forfeitures in rem prior to 
Austin and Bajakajian. 
The county program, however, should be challenged as an excessive 
fine under the Eighth Amendment.  The analysis begins with the text and 
purpose of the Eighth Amendment.  The purpose of the Amendment, as 
 
147 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 
(2000) (exploring the various judicial and legislative approaches to the question of what 
property interests an individual has in his or her own body); see also Leigh M. Harlan, When 
Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 
54 DUKE L.J. 179 (2004) (arguing that the proper legal challenges to databases that maintain 
DNA samples for purposes other than particular criminal investigations are on property 
grounds).  Harlan contends that the Fourth Amendment is inadequate to protect individuals’ 
DNA from permanent databases and that labor, utilitarian, and personality arguments all 
justify the recognition of DNA as personal property.  Thus the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments would provide more adequate protection of individual rights.  See also Erik S. 
Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[’s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of 
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 
(1990) (arguing that laws authorizing coroners to remove tissue from cadavers without the 
consent of the deceased’s next of kin violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).   
 The issue of human organ trafficking is another interesting point for discussion that is 
tangentially related to DNA collection statutes.  For further reading, see Theodore Silver, 
The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. 
L. REV. 681 (1988) (arguing that there is no property right to post-mortem organs and that 
the National Organ Transplant Act makes human organs valueless on the open market). 
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interpreted by the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris and Austin, is to limit 
the prosecutorial power of the government.148
By collecting DNA samples from arrestees in circumvention of the 
federal and state DNA collection statutes, the district attorney’s office has 
expanded its prosecutorial power in several ways.  First, inclusion in a 
DNA database makes the individual a de facto person of interest in any 
crime in which a DNA sample taken from the crime scene is checked 
against the database.  Law enforcement agencies have greater access to a 
larger number of potential suspects without having to do the field work that 
would be necessary absent a database of DNA data.
 
149
The statutes that authorize DNA collection in all fifty states and by the 
federal government have provisions that order the destruction of the sample 
and removal from the database upon the fulfillment of certain 
circumstances.  These conditions include acquittal, completion of sentence, 
and having the charges dropped, upon which every state statute authorizing 
the collection of DNA from arrestees calls for the destruction of collected 
samples.
  This is a significant 
expansion of the county’s prosecutorial power. 
150
One argument against this interpretation is that the county, by 
dropping criminal charges against arrestees, is actually relinquishing its 
prosecutorial power.  Although this is a relevant consideration, on balance 
the state emerges from the “exchange” with a lasting DNA sample while the 
arrestee emerges with a one-time reprieve from criminal prosecution for a 
misdemeanor offense.  The county does not actually “relinquish” anything, 
given that it makes the decision whether to offer the deal to an arrestee and 
holds a lasting power over the arrestee by keeping his DNA on file 
permanently without limitation.  The county maintains the power to 
prosecute any arrestee who declines the offer.  At no point does the county 
relinquish the prosecutorial power.  It merely chooses whether to exercise it 
immediately (through criminal prosecution) or “save it for later” (by taking 
a DNA sample). 
  The county operates its database without such safeguards.  
These problems suggest that the county government is operating beyond its 
prescribed scope of prosecutorial power and that it is using the DNA 
collection program to further expand the scope of the prosecutorial power. 
 
148  Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., 
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1988).  
149 Expanded DNA databases are increasingly valuable tools for law enforcement 
agencies.  One article reports that it takes only 500 microseconds to search a database of 
100,000 profiles.  Tony Duster, DNA Dragnets and Race: Larger Social Context, History, 
and Future, GENEWATCH, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/ 
GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=56&archive=yes (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
150 See supra Part II. 
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The next question in an excessive fines analysis is whether the 
government action is punitive.  The district attorney’s office suggested 
several purposes for its program.  The program could deter potential 
criminals, help the law enforcement in future investigations, and reduce the 
burden on the stressed district attorney’s office and law enforcement 
agencies.151  The stated purpose of deterrence is an obvious indicator that 
the government views the program as a punishment.  “Deterrence . . . has 
traditionally been viewed as a goal of punishment.”152
The timing of the offer also indicates that the county intends the 
program to be punitive.  Consider again the example of Charlie Wolcott, 
who went into the county court house to fight his misdemeanor trespassing 
charge: 
  The publication of 
this program to county residents has the possible effect of deterring conduct 
that would result in a misdemeanor arrest and thus the offer for inclusion in 
the database.  This is a general deterrent and can be interpreted as a 
punishment.  An alternative argument for considering the program to be a 
punishment is the government’s targeting of arrestees facing trial.  If this 
program was not a punitive device, the county government could simply 
inform individuals that they may submit a sample to the county’s DNA 
database as a public safety measure.  By targeting suspected criminals, the 
county manages to focus squarely on deterring criminal behavior through 
alternative punishment. 
Before he was called in front of the judge, Wolcott . . . w[as] called into a soundproof 
room in the back of the court.  There, Deputy Dist. Atty. Nicholas Zovko made [him] 
an offer.  “He takes me and one other guy to the back of the courtroom, and says 
basically, ‘The district attorney’s office would like to make a deal with you,’” Wolcott 
said.  “‘If you give a DNA sample, we will drop all charges.’”153
The county presumably could have offered this particular deal to 
Wolcott at the time of arrest or when notifying him of his court date.  
Instead, the Deputy District Attorney chose the moment before Wolcott was 
about to go in front of the judge to offer a sort of alternative arrangement. 
 
The purpose of the program is ultimately to reduce crime and make the 
law enforcement process more efficient.  To accomplish this goal, the 
government seeks to take DNA samples from arrestees and store them in a 
database for future investigations.  The county’s actions suggest a clear 
punitive intent to the program.  Perhaps the most telling is a quote from the 
district attorney’s office: “There’s consequences when you commit a crime.  
 
151 Abdollah, supra note 10, at A1. 
152 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998). 
153 Abdollah, supra note 1, at A3.  
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This is actually a better option for them than other avenues, of, I guess, 
going through the penal process.”154
Although the purpose of the program suggests that providing a DNA 
sample is punitive, perhaps the effect of the program on individuals is more 
powerful evidence of its punitive nature.  Permanent inclusion in a DNA 
database used exclusively for criminal investigations has a powerful 
punitive effect on the individual.  Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals perhaps best summarized the punitive effect of inclusion 
in such a database:  
 
Every time new evidence is discovered from a crime scene, the government will 
search [the defendant’s] genetic code to determine whether he has committed the 
crime—just as the government might search his house for evidence linking him to the 
crime scene—despite the fact that the government may never have cause to suspect 
him again.155   
Though jurors and viewers of CSI may consider DNA evidence to be 
error-proof, there are significant risks associated with over-reliance on 
DNA evidence.156
The next question in the excessive fines analysis is whether the fine is 
excessive.  One must first assume that DNA is personal property.  As 
discussed in Part IV, there are statutory and case law grounds for 
considering one’s DNA as his or her personal property.  Even if it is 
personal property, however, genetic material does not fit within the 
framework of any statute authorizing forfeiture of property.
  These lifelong concerns for individuals who submit to 
the county’s program suggest that the program should be considered 
punitive under an Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis. 
157
 
154 Abdollah, supra note 
  These 
10, at A1. 
155 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 870 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
156 It is possible, when searching against a large database, for a “cold hit” to match a 
sample at a crime scene with an innocent individual.  Further, human error can contaminate, 
mislabel, and misinterpret DNA evidence.  See William C. Thompson, The Potential for 
Error in Forensic DNA Testing, GENEWATCH, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/ 
GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=57&archive=yes (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (2006):  
(d) Any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this section may be 
seized and forfeited to the United States.  All provisions of law relating to the seizures, summary, 
and judicial forfeiture procedures, and condemnation of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and 
baggage for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such vessels, vehicles, merchandise, 
and baggage or the proceeds from such sale; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and 
the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such 
forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred or alleged to have been incurred under 
the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with such provisions.  
Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person in respect to the 
seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage under the customs laws 
shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property used or intended for use in 
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statutes assume a tangible nexus between the prohibited action being 
punished and the property being forfeited.  One obvious argument is that 
one’s genetic makeup is a necessary component of every action (including 
illegal actions) that the individual takes.  These statutes, however, clearly 
draw a distinction between the individual and his property.  It seems highly 
improbable that Congress would draw a distinction between an individual 
and his genetic material to make such a determination. 
In Part III, this Comment discussed the analytical framework that 
future courts will likely use in evaluating Excessive Fines Clause cases.  
The fine must be grossly disproportional to the offense for it to be 
excessive.158  Courts will look to two sources: the legislature (to determine 
what punishment the legislature thought was appropriate for the offense) 
and other courts (to determine whether the punishment is consistent with 
that for similar crimes.)159
The first consideration is how the punishment relates to the appropriate 
punishment for the offense set out by the legislature.
  Using this analytical framework for determining 
excessiveness, the forfeiture of DNA as an alternative punishment for 
criminal misdemeanor charges may be excessive. 
160
Another consideration, however, is that the program simply offers an 
alternative to the penal process and allows individuals to get out of criminal 
charges without a blemish on their criminal records.  The defendant has a 
choice in this matter: he can elect to stand trial and fight the charges or he 
can submit a DNA sample, pay $75, and move on from the incident.  
Perhaps a court would consider that to be appropriate given the nature of 
the charges facing defendants eligible for this program.  On balance, 
however, significant weight should be given to the presumption of 
innocence that attaches to a criminal defendant.  Further, if the county were 
to follow the guidelines set forth by the state and federal DNA databases, it 
would not be able to maintain DNA samples from individuals convicted of 
non-violent misdemeanors permanently without destroying them after a 
  The appropriate 
punishment for a misdemeanor conviction varies, but the individuals 
subjected to the Orange County fine are not convicts.  The presumption of 
innocence stays with a criminal defendant until he is found guilty, and it is 
unjust to punish him absent due process of law.  Until there is a guilty plea, 
the defendant should maintain the right to be free from government 
punishment, especially in a misdemeanor case in which there would be no 
threat to society from his release while awaiting trial. 
 
violation of this section by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be designated for that 
purpose by the Attorney General. 
158 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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certain period.  This suggests disproportionality between the offense and the 
punishment. 
The second consideration in the Bajakajian test is whether the 
defendant’s punishment is consistent with the punishment for similar 
crimes: 
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be 
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; 
and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.161
Currently, Orange County is alone in operating such a program, so it is 
unclear how other jurisdictions would treat such a program.  The Court in 
Bajakajian, however, declined to declare a bright-line rule on excessiveness 
because it felt that the question of the appropriateness of punishment was 




  It is important to note at this point that no 
legislature has actually authorized the Orange County district attorney’s 
plan; it is currently an executive action without legislative approval.  This 
may suggest a greater susceptibility to being struck down. 
Challenges under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause are 
rare.  The overreaching nature of the Orange County district attorney’s plan, 
however, raises a variety of legal and moral questions, and the question of 
whether this is an excessive fine is an important one. 
Criminal defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence.  This 
presumption is fundamental to our criminal justice system and should not 
be disrupted.  A non-violent misdemeanor arrestee should not be faced with 
the prospect of defending himself against criminal charges or subjecting 
himself to a lifetime of criminal investigations simply because a prosecutor 
offers a quick fix for his minor legal problem.  The county plan, however, 
presents individuals with this choice moments before they are scheduled to 
face a judge.  As it stands, the county program gives the county expanded 
prosecutorial power over non-violent misdemeanor arrestees that do not get 
the benefit of trial.  This expansion of prosecutorial power is exactly what 
the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect against. 
In Bajakajian, the Court held that it would consider the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty when determining whether a fine is 
excessive.163
 
161 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
  Under the county program, an arrested individual who has not 
162 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336. 
163 Id. at 336–37. 
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been convicted an offense is still subject to a lifetime of criminal 
investigations any time the county chooses to run a DNA sample from a 
crime scene against its DNA database.  This is a harsher penalty than a 
convict faces under statutes that require the destruction of the sample after 
the convict has completed his sentence.164
 
164 See supra Part II. 
  A program that subjects an 
unconvicted individual to a harsher penalty than what he or she would face 
if convicted is excessive and should not stand up to a challenge under the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 
